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John Fi1z111u1mct' hos :,t11ilied F11m/h'WI intcf.}.mtin11 
w the /11sti!11tc of £1ffO/h'(III A fj(lirs of the Unirersity 
r:f Brussr!s wul is prt'puring o rhois for Rri.Hol 
Uni\'er.\ity on /Jofiric(l,I group.\ in the Furo11ca11 
Par iw11c11t. lfis article is hascd upon information 
iathered in N(inr11y u11d i)cnnwr"- dtffing the 
recent referenda u1mpaig11s. 
ThErn wsre many similarities in the campaigns on 
entry into the EEC conducted in Norway and 
Denmark, and in both countries the effective 
decision was taken by referendum and not by the 
national Parliament. Yet the results of the refer-
enda differed radically. In Norway 53% of the 
votes cast were against entry (turnout 77.6%); 
in Denmark one week later 64% of el€ctors voted 
in favour of entry (turnout 90.1% - a national 
record). An analysis of the cempaign in each 
country sheds an interesting light upon political 
attitudes in Norway and Denmark and upon the 
'image· of the EEC in these countries. 
Why a referendum? 
In both countries a referendum was n€cessary for 
constitutional reasons. In Norway the constitution 
permits the transfer of sovereign powers to inter-
national institutions by parliament, providing that 
the Srol'ling (Parliament) assents by a three-
quarters majority. It was estimated that some 44 
members of the .\ful'lin~ oppos€d entry, and 38 
votes against would have provided a blocking 
quarter. Only a clear and unequivocal 'Yes· from 
the people would persuade a sufficient number of 
these members lo vote for entry. But only in this 
way would a consultative referendum be 'binding' 
upon the Storti,1g 
The Danish Constitution permits the transfer of 
sovereign power to internat1011al institutions by 
treaty. Treaties are made by t11e Crown, but re-
quire ratification where their implementation would 
need legislative action. If the lolkcting does not 
assent to the transfer of sovereignty by a five-
sixths majority the proposal must be submitted 
to a referendum, in which it is deemed to have 
been defeated if a majority of vot€s are cast 
against it, and the vote against constitutes at 
least 30% of the electorate. The final vote in the 
Folkding on the law ratifying the Treaty of Acces-
sion was 131 to 34 in favour; so the five-sixths 
majority required to avoid a referendum was not 
obtained. 
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The campaigns 
In both countries the sca!es seemed heavily 
uc:ghted in favour of entry, and in both it was 
C:clilported by the largest and governing social-
rj1_::rnocr2tic parties. 
111 Denmark all the moderate non-socialist parties 
w~te in favour, indsed it was their government 
undu Hilrnar Baunsgaard which had initiated the 
ncgot:ations with the EEC in July 1971. In Norway 
c1!l tile moderate parties except the Scnrerparti,:,t 
(the Centre Party, formerly tr1e Agrarian Party) 
v1hich had only 20 ol the 150 seats in tl,e Srorting, 
cupported EEC entry. 
On the other hand, in Denmark, as in Norway, 
opinion in some parties was divided. At a special 
conference held in September 1972 the Danish 
Social D€mocrats vol€d 272-95 in favour of entry 
and 12 of the 70 Danish Social-Democrat MPs 
,vcre to vote against. 11 of the 74 Norwegian 
Labour Party MPs voted against entry. 
Five of the 27 Danish Radical MPs voted against 
joining the EEC, and in Norway both the Vcn,rrc 
( LibHals) and the Christian People's Party were 
split. In Denmark only the s·,1cicilisti.\k. Fo/kcpw·tei 
(Socialist People's Party), which had 17 of the 
179 mEmbcrs in the Folkl'ii11g. came out against 
rntry, and they were joined by a number of small 
1)arties not represen:ed in Parliament and which 
had together obtained only some 6% of the votes 
at the previous election. 
Otherwise in both countries opposition was con-
fined to a small number of extra-parliamentary 
groups. In both countries business and commer-
cial organisations were in favour. as were the 
trades unions (although these had large dissent-
ing minorities). 
Two countries divided 
Divisions of opinion witl1in parties notwithstanding. 
most informed observe1s in Europe appea1ed to 
have been under the impression that the case for 
miry was overwhelmingly accepted, and that the 
negotiations with the Community had removed all 
real obstacles to entry. It soon became apparent 
however, at lrnst in the Norwegian case, that in 
the opinion of the public vital economic interests 
had not been protected; and in both countries 
doubts arose over tile non-economic issues. The 
rc:sult was an unexpectedly virulent and bitter 
campaign, which at times overstepped the bounds 
of tolerance and good taste. In Norway in par-
ticular. the campaign was in danger of degenerat-
ing into an exchm1ge of recriminations and 
accusations of 'selling No1way out'. Not only 
political parti€s were split; so too were families 
and friendships. 1 he campaign took on emotive 
and chauvinistic overtones ( one slogan ran: "This 
is our country. No to EEC"). Hatred and fear of 
the Germans and anti-Catholic sentiment were re-
vived. In Denmark the campaign was less virulent, 
but the same tendencies were noticeable. 
In both countries a remarkable and unexpected 
prominence was given to non-economic issues, 
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and in both a broadly based ad hoe body. inde-
pendent of the traditional parties. was formed to 
organise and coordinate opposition to EEC entry. 
This organisation, known in both countries as the 
Po1m.lar /1..10\·ement ugui11H the Ll~C. acted as an 
'umbrella' and rallying-point for all groups and 
individuals active in the opposition, regardless of 
ideology. The movement had affiliated to it poli-
tical parties, committees of dissenters from poli-
tical parties. aJ !toe groups, student bodies and 
private individuals. It placed great emphasis on 
its popular origins, upon its status outside normal 
party politics, and upon its independence of the 
national 'Establishment', which tended to support 
entry. The Popular Movement played upon a wide-
spread cynicism concerning politicians and those 
in authority, and sought to tum the campaign into 
a battle against the 'Establishment' which alleged-
ly wished to impose entry into the EEC upon a re-
luctant people. The campaign was also depicted 
as a struggle between younger idealistic, and 
older materialistic citizens. 
The economic issues 
As is well known, northern Norway has a develop-
ment problem and is dependent upon fisheries, 
and NorwEgian agricultural price levels are higher 
than those fixed by the Common Agricultural 
., 
Policy of the Community; once the Norwegian and 
EEC markets are integrated certain price advan-
tages and protections would have been lost. On 
economic grounds alone it was to be expected 
that the countryside would vote 'No'. 
The situation in Denmark was quite different. Here 
there was no fisheries problem and the farming 
community and food processing industries stood 
to gain considerably from entry. Nor was there 
any regional problem to parallel that of Norway. 
Almost all social groups stood to gain from join-
ing the EEC, and in Denmark the economic de-
bate was about the size and nature of the eco-
nomic benefits and the manner in which they 
should be distributed. Only the urban workers 
could have misgivings, and their apprehensions 
seem equally to have been based upon non-
economic considerations. 
The EEC 'Levi£than' 
The opponents of entry depicted the Community 
as a dangerous 'Leviathan' which would devour 
the small states, and which was concerned only 
with the interests of the moneyed and the power-
ful. It was made out that the small man would not 
brnefit, mainly because he would not have access 
to the decision-makers. The EEC was presented 
as 2.n anti-democratic, remote, and bureaucratic 
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entity. Was it not already hard enough to influence 
the national government? What then of the Com-
mission in Brussels? Thus the spectre of distant 
rule was evoked -- the EEC was alleged to be 
concerned only with economic growth. to be in-
sensitive to human needs, and to be opposed to 
the model social legislation of Norway and 
Denmark. 
Ideological opposition 
For the socialist or ~{//1chi.,rc opposition the 
European Community was the economic arm 
of the Atlantic Alliance and part of the apparatus 
of a divided Europe. For these opponents the 
whole philosophy of the Treaty of Accession arose 
out of the need to overcome the increasing 'con-
tradictions' within domestic capitalism. The free 
movement of labour, goods and capital was 
alleged to be essentially capitalistic in concep-
tion. EEC policies were said to benefit the capi-
talist and harm the worker by removing many of 
the controls which had been imposed upon the 
private sector by the national government, and to 
reduce the bargaining power of the working class. 
In Denmark these views were propagated by the 
Socialist People's Party, by the Communists and 
by the Ve/litre S1wi11lis1er (Left Socialists), who had 
together obtained some 15% of the vote at the 
previous election. as well as by extra-parliament-
ary groups and by student activists. In Norway 
they were propagated only by students and other 
extra-parliamentary activists. 
The 'Nordic Dream' 
Nordic sentiment was a powerful weapon in the 
armoury of the opponents of entry. It was held 
that by joining the EEC Denmark and Norway 
would end Nordic cooperation, which was a pro-
mising alternative to entry. A strong Scandinavia, 
based on thorough-going Nordic cooperation, 
could pursue more acceptable social and eco-
nomic policies, influence the EEC positively from 
outside ( it was never explained why it should not 
do so from within) and act as a bridge between 
East and West. But the cultural and linguistic 
affinities of the Scandinavian countries ( Finland 
excepted) merely obscure the fact that the fruits 
of Nordic cooperation over the last 150 years 
have been meagre. Apart from the creation of a 
unified labour market. frorn od lzoc cooperation in 
transport, and from the setting up of a consulta-
tive Nordic Council, nothing concrete has been 
achieved. The completely different economic 
structures of the four countries, the economic ties 
of Finland with the USSR, and the dominance of 
Sweden have impeded attempts at economic 
union, and diverging interests have prevented the 
most exposed Scandinavian countries, Denmark 
and Finland, from obtaining from Nordic coopera-
tion the security which in their case is so bnsic 
a concern. It was after the collapse of negotiations 
for a Nordic Defence Union that Norway and 
Denmark joined NATO. 
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Outwardly, in buildings and methods, change 
in the City is moving fast. But the City is 
unchanging in those basis abstractions summed 
up by integrity and probity. 
Confidence is currency in the City. 
For a ccnturv and a lulf Klcinwort, Benson 
have advisee! upon and helped finance the 
trading activities of British industry at home 
and overseas. In the raising of capital, financing 
of exports, managing and advising on 
investments, and in many other ways, 
Kleinwort, Brnson have helped hundreds of 
private and public industrial companies. 
Advice based on this wealth of experience is 
readily available. 
Kleinwort Benson 
20 hnchurcl1 ~trcct, l.ondon FC31\I 3DB 
'J'clcplionc: o 1 -626 1 53 1 
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Nationalisi opposition 
In both Denmark and Norway opposition to entry 
took in some cases an overt and virulently 
'national' or patriotic form. Even the 'populist' 
arguments of the left exploited these sentiments. 
This 'national' theme was closely bound up with 
the 'Nordic· argument, and involved a dislike of 
greJt power politics, and the fe3r of large hi, rs 
which would increase tension in Europe and even-
iually lead to the formation of a 'Europe1:n Army'. 
Sovece'gnty and independence were seen as 
price:ess attributes which were not to be sur-
rendered. This argument carried particular weight 
in Norway which has been independent only since 
1905. 
This was the more positive aspect of the 'nation-
alist' argument. The negative aspect was to be 
sc:n in the overt appeal to chauvinism. Much was 
made of the unlimited duration of the Rome 
Treaty; voters were reminded of their responsi-
bility to the next generation; one placard showing 
a young child bore the caption: "I too want to be 
Danish when I grow up". A cartoon in Information, 
an intellectuals' newspaper, showed two children 
in a cart, one white. one of mixed race. and bore 
the caption: 'Our successors·. 
Ebbe Re'ch. a well-known Danish author. argued 
in a television debate that language was the basis 
of any Community, and asked how Danes could 
have any effective understanding of or influence 
in a polygot community such as the EEC. Pa11e 
Lauring. a popular hisforian, compared the day 
of the referendum with the day the Nazis occupied 
Denmark. 
In both Norway and Denmark (although to a 
lesser degree in Denmark, and to a surprisingly 
limited degree in frontier nreas) overt anti-German 
sentiments were expressed, based upon memories 
of the Nazi occupation, and in the case of Den-
mark upon memories which went further back 
still. These sentiments also derived from fea1s of 
German land purchases, and of German domina-
tion of the EEC in general. 
Religion 
In Norway the evangelical wing of the Lutheran 
Church and in Denmark the /ndrcmi.\.,io11 ( a low-
church group with most of its support in rural 
Jutland) strongly opposed entry on the grounds 
that the EEC was a Catholic-dominated grouping 
with a cosmopolitan and rnaterialistic outlook. 
Entry would threaten a certain rural attitude of 
mind and way of life (a way of life which has 
been satirised by Ibsen). Entry to the EEC would 
break down rural exclusiveness, and. in the opin-
ion of these groups, would accentuate modern 
tendencies towards permissiveness and the break-
down of authority. One opposition grouping went 
so far as to proclaim: "A vote for the EEC is a 
vote against God". The appeal of such extremism 
was limited, but the force of this more grneral 
'moral' and inward-looking opposition should not 
be underestimated. 
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Arguments in favour of entry 
Tl1e campaign in favour of entry was conducted :n 
G lower emotive key. The principal argument de-
ployed v1as that colid economic benefits could 
be expected in both industry and agriculture, 
benefits which were indeed essential to the 
achievement of the kind of social and human 
:)rogress sought by the opponents of entry. 
Supporters of entry condemned isolationist ten-
deoc'cs and appealed to idealism in their ad-
vocacy of progressive and peaceful cooperat;on 
in Europe. A great deal was made of the absence 
of n viable economic or political alternative to 
ihe EEC. 
I, was argued that refusal of full membership 
v.;ould lead in both Norway and Denmark to de-
v2.luation and widespread unemployment, and that 
ihese consequences could not be avoided by a 
Free Trade Agreement with the EEC. Indeed the 
prospect of economic disaster was at times over-
emphasised. 
It was pointed out that many of the fears of the 
opponents of entry were exaggerated or lacked 
ioundation: much Nordic cooperation could con-
tinue inside the EEC; fea,·s with regard to loss of 
covere:gnty and domination by larger countries 
were groundless. Other small member states could 
live with the EEC, and its decision-making process 
was such as to provide them with ample safe-
guards. Further integration beyond the Rome 
Treaty v1as for the moment hypothetical; it would 
in any case require the members' unanimous con-
sent and ratification by individual parliaments. and 
in Denmark it would even need a referendum. 
Why different results? 
/Is we have seen, the campaign on entry into the 
EEC took similar organisational and ideological 
forms in both Denmark and Norway. In both 
countries opponents of entry sought to create a 
broad populist coalition which would be composed 
of three groups: those who stood to lose from 
entry economically; the ideological left (the Marx-
ist parties within both countries, a minority oi 
cocial democrats, the student activists and some 
populist pressure group, e.g .. the environmental-
ists); and the nationalist' opposition -- rural con-
servatives. nationalists, and the evangelical move. 
ment, for wt10m defence of national sovereignty 
was paramount and who considered that entry 
would bring about an erosion of traditional values 
In Norway the coalition proved to be a winninq 
one, and it is significant that in Norway rural 
voters account for more than half the total ( sec 
Table). Naturally, those parts of the country which 
were most dependent upon farming and fishing 
and which were at the s0me time conservative in 
outlook voted overwhelmingly against entry. The 
effect of the ideological opposition in the cities. 
together with the significantly lower urban turnout 
was to ensure that an insufficient number of 'Yes· 
votss would be cast in the urban areas to com-
pensate for the 'No' votes from the countryside. 
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This disparate h/o,. composed of those who sought 
to defend traditional moral, national and religious 
values on the one hand. and of the ·revolutionary' 
groups on the other hand, who were opposed to 
these very same values could agree on little or 
nothing beyond total opposition to the EEC. and 
they were indeed quite unconcerned about the 
cons£quences of their actions, being unable to 
agree on positive alternatives. 
A similar coalition failed in Denmark. Here the 
decisive factor was the absence of a group which 
stood to lose economically. Unlike Norway the 
countryside in Denmark is neither starkly urban 
nor rural, but is for the most part a blend of the 
two: consequently it did not provide the basis for 
a strong nationalist or revivalist opposition. As in 
Norway the rural areas polled in force, but the 
Danish rural areas voted strongly in favour of 
entry, so that the weight of the 'No' in inner 
Copenhagen was offset. 
Nor were the conditions for a broad socialist 
opposition to be found in Denmark, if one excepts 
the working-class 'gl1ettoes' of inner Copenhagen: 
outside Copenhagen the Marxist-orientated work-
ing class was too small. In Denmark the rural and 
the suburban voters saw themselves as benefi-
ciaries of entry, and they were politically moder-
ate. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that dur-
ing the final period of the campaign in Denmark 
the opponents of entry, and in particular socialist 
opponents, overplayed their hand by the extrem-
ism of their propaganda and provoked a backlash 
amongst what is after all a tolerant, moderate, and 
unemotional people. Denmark therefore took what 
it saw to be a realistic decision, unclouded by 
sentiment or nationalism, and one which looked 
to the future rather than to the past. At the same 
time, both Denmark and Norway gave the Euro-
pean Communities notice that they cannot expect 
uncritical support in these countries, and that they 
must deliver the goods in human as well as eco-
nomic terms, or else face relentless criticism. 
Urban-rural population distribution in Norway and Denmark 
Percentage of total population 
Population of: 
------· ---------------
Norway Denmark 
-----------
------ - --------
The capital 12.5 26 8 
·--- -------
The capital and 
three surrounding 29.6 43.2 
electoral districts 
-------
---
The capital; three 
surrounding electoral 44.3 
I 
51.4 
districts: fifteen 
next largest towns 
Source: 1967 Population Estimates 
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Modern Norway 
Oil is a part of J\'lodcrn l\on't'ay. 
The promising, deposits in the North Sea 
are an inspiration and a challenge to the 
Norwegian husiness community. 
Ucn norskc Crcditbank, Norwafs largest 
commercial hank, is participating in 
meeting this challenge. 
Hut Norwegian companies are not thinking 
solcll in terms o[ oil. Our traditional 
industries, such as fishing, mining and 
wood-procl'ssing, arc also concerned with 
tomorrow's possibilities in Norwa~· and 
abroad. The same is true of our steadily 
expanding: Merchant Flt·ct. 
In addition to these traditional industries, 
Modern 1':orwal is also characterized by 
- the aluminium industry 
- ferro-metallurgical 
- the electronics industry 
- a varied engineering industry 
\Ve knm-'t' Non, t·gi:m industr~· and would 
he happ.Y to he ol· scn'icc to) ou. 
Our address is: Kirkcgalcn 21, Oslo I. 
Telephone 11 61190. Tele, OSLO 18175. 
Den 11orske Creditba11k 
An ilnportant part 
of the modern Norway 
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